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How best to help children with ‘special educational needs’ (SEN) is a controversial issue in 
many countries. In England, SEN programmes largely consist of asking schools to identify 
pupils with learning difficulties and then to decide on appropriate school-level interventions 
(e.g.  one-to-one  tuition,  teaching  assistance).  About  20  per  cent  of  English  students 
participate in these programmes.  
 
It is difficult to evaluate the causal effect of SEN programmes because children who are 
selected  for  the  programmes  are  different  from  other  children  in  ways  that  are  not 
observable to the analyst. We try to overcome this problem by using variation in school 
context which is shown to be important in determining the probability of entering a SEN 
programme.  We  evaluate  whether  participating  in  a  SEN  programme  has  any  effect  on 
educational  attainment  by  the  end  of  primary  school  (in  Key  Stage  2  tests).  We  also 
investigate whether an increase in the overall proportion of SEN students in a year group 
generates spillover effects on other students in the same year group.  
 
SEN programmes are largely defined at the local level.  While they can take account of local 
knowledge  and  resources,  the  programmes  may  become  context-specific,  especially  for 
children  with  moderate  difficulties,  for  which  the  diagnosis  is  not  usually  medical.  This 
means that a child with a significant learning difficulty may not have access to remediation 
simply because she attends a school where there are a lot of other children with stronger 
learning difficulties. At the same time a child with only moderate difficulties may have access 
to a remediation programme simply because she attends a school where nobody else has 
learning difficulties. The first question asked by this paper is whether such variations across 
schools  translate  into  variations  in  the  relative  performance  of  children  with  moderate 
difficulties at school. Our results suggest that while access to a SEN programme is strongly 
determined  by  school  context,  this  does  not  translate  into  any  variation  in  educational 
attainment.  SEN  programmes  have  no  effect  on  participating  students  in  terms  of 
educational attainment at the end of primary school. 
 One possible reason for observing no significant effect of SEN programmes on the relative 
performance of participants may be that non-participants are themselves indirectly affected 
by  the  programme.  To  analyse  this,  we  look  at  whether  the  overall  proportion  of  SEN 
students has any impact on overall educational attainment in the year group.  We need to 
find a source of variation in the data that influences the proportion of SEN students without 
directly affecting educational attainment. We use demographic shocks across year groups 
(within schools) as this source of variation. We find no evidence for significant spillover 
effects.  
 
Our analysis suggests that SEN programmes are not effective in achieving their stated aims 
for children with moderate learning difficulties. The ways in which such children are helped 
need to be reconsidered.    
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1  Introduction 
 
 
A controversial issue in education throughout the world is the design of remediation policies 
for pupils with learning difficulties.
2 In recent times, the policy agenda in the US and the UK 
has moved to consider the needs of all children more explicitly (i.e. not only the average 
pupil). This can be seen in the US with ‘No Child Left Behind’ and in the UK with the ‘Every 
Child  Matters’.  Whether  every  child  benefits  from  government  policy  is  an  empirical 
question – and one important indicator is what government programmes do for children 
with  learning  difficulties.  England  has  opted  for  a  highly  decentralized  policy  (Special 
Education Needs programmes, hereafter SEN), designed to address the specific difficulties of 
each child. Such policies are difficult to evaluate because children with learning difficulties 
are not randomly assigned to programmes. Furthermore, the selection mechanism is not 
usually fully observed (if at all) by researchers, making it very difficult to distinguish between 
the effects of the programme and selection into the programme in any analysis. Hence, good 
studies that evaluate remediation policies are rare.
3 This paper provides one of the first 
evaluations of the effect of  a SEN programme  on the relative performance of treated 
students compared to non-treated students within the same year group. It also investigates 
whether an increase in the overall proportion of treated students in a year group generates 
spillover effects on non-treated students in the same year group.  
 
In England, SEN programmes largely consist of asking schools to identify pupils with learning 
difficulties and then to adapt their teaching strategies accordingly with the help of a Code of 
Practice.
4 About 20% of English pupils  participate in these programmes. Interventions are 
decided at school-level and include one -to-one tuition, teaching assistance etc. At each 
school, there is a SEN coordinator who oversees the implementation of this policy. The SEN 
                                                 
2 See for example, the debate on the effectiveness of special education programmes in the US (Hanushek et al. 
2002, versus Morgan et al. 2008) or the debate on the effectiveness of grade retention in the US, France and 
other countries (Manacorda, 2010). 
3  Exceptions include Crawford and Vignoles (2010) for England; Hanushek et al. (2002) for the US   and 
Schlosser and Lavy (2005) for Israel. 
4A small percentage of children (about 3% of the population) get a Statement of Special Educational Needs 
through the Local Authority.  2 
 
team typically receives resources from the school budget to achieve the remediation targets 
that are specific to the school. Overall SEN expenditure amounts to about £1,320 per SEN 
pupil (on average). Notionally, this is about 30% of the average spending per targeted pupil. 
In practice, schools have flexibility about how they spend SEN resources.  
 
SEN  programmes  have  the  attractive  feature  of  being  designed  to  address  the  specific 
difficulties  of  each  pupil.  They  are  targeted  at  individuals,  rather  than  whole  classes  or 
schools. On the other hand, such a policy might possibly generate individual stigma and thus 
be counterproductive, especially for pupils with relatively minor difficulties. In other words, 
the labelling of a child as SEN could itself be a source of difficulty.  
 
The second basic feature of SEN programmes is that they are largely defined at the local 
level, by school heads themselves. The obvious advantage of such decentralized policies is 
that they can better take account of local constraints and make better use of local resources. 
On the other hand, the policy may become context-specific, especially for children with 
moderate difficulties, for which the diagnosis is not usually medical. What this means is that 
a  child  with  a  significant  learning  difficulty  may  not  have  access  to  remediation  simply 
because she attends a school where there are a lot of other children with stronger learning 
difficulties. At the same time a child with only moderate difficulties may have access to a 
remediation  programme  simply  because  she  attends  a  school  where  nobody  else  has 
learning difficulties. In this way, a SEN programme defined at the school level may be a 
source  of  very  significant  variation  across  schools  in  the  relative  access  to  remediation 
programmes for children with moderate learning difficulties The first question asked by this 
paper  is  whether  these  variations translate  into  variations  across  schools  in the  relative 
performance of children with moderate difficulties at school.  
 
Our  paper  sheds  light  on  this  issue  using  a  unique  longitudinal  dataset  (National  Pupil 
Database) which provides information on SEN assignment and test scores in national tests 
that take place when pupils are of age 7 and 11. These data confirm that there are very 
significant  variations  in  the  probability  of  SEN  assignment  across  children  with  similar 
learning difficulties at age 7 but attending different schools. Importantly, these differences 
are much less marked for pupils who achieve a relatively high performance or relatively low 3 
 
performance early on in primary school than for pupils in-between these two extremes. 
Pupils who achieve a relatively high performance at age 7 are almost never assigned to a SEN 
programme,  regardless  of  their  school  context.  Similarly,  pupils  who  achieve  very  low 
performance at age 7 are almost always assigned to a SEN programme and there is no 
significant probability gap according to their school type. In contrast, the gap in access to 
SEN is very significant for pupils with moderate difficulties. These pupils are much more 
often assigned to a SEN programme when they attend a high-context school (where the 
average  level  of  age  7 test  attainment  is  relatively  high)  than  when they  attend  a  low-
context  school.  Thus,  the  decentralized  design  of  SEN  policy  generates  significant 
inequalities  in  access  to  remediation  resources  across  children  with  similar  (moderate) 
difficulties at age 7.  
 
Secondly, we show that the specific variation across schools in access to SEN resources for 
pupils with moderate difficulties early on in primary school does not generate any change in 
academic performance at the end of primary school. The improvement of pupil performance 
between age 7 and 11 is slightly faster in high-context than in low-context schools. But this 
difference  in  improvement  across  contexts  is  almost  exactly  the  same  for  pupils  who 
achieved a relatively high performance or a relatively low performance or somewhere in-
between with regard to attainment in tests at age 7. In other words, the school context 
generates a very significant difference in access to SEN resources for children with moderate 
difficulties early on in primary school (when compared to other children), but no difference 
at all in relative performance at the end of primary school. This result suggests that there is 
no net effect of being assigned to a SEN programme on the relative performance of pupils 
with moderate difficulties compared to other pupils in the same year group and the same 
school. 
 
One possible reason for observing no significant effect of SEN programmes on the relative 
performance of participants may be that non-participants are themselves indirectly affected 
by the programme. As it turns out, SEN programmes typically involve a reorganisation of 
teaching practice which might generate spillover effects on non-participants. For example, if 
the group of non-SEN pupils keeps on working while SEN pupils are attending their particular 
classes,  the  programme  may  be  associated  with  an  increase  in  the  quality  of  teaching 4 
 
received by  non-SEN  pupils.  However,  in  this case,  we  should  observe  that the average 
performance  of  a  year  group  is  positively  affected  by  the  overall  proportion  of  SEN 
participants  in  the  year  group.  We explore this  issue  by  using  school-level  demographic 
shocks as a source of exogenous variation in the overall proportion of children assigned to a 
SEN programme in a year group. Specifically, the proportion of SEN students in a given year 
group is shown to be positively affected by the proportion of relatively young students in 
other  year  groups,  namely  the  proportion  of  August  born  students  (in  the  UK,  August 
corresponds to the end of the academic year). Using this in the context of an Instrumental 
Variable  strategy  suggests  that  exogenous  change  in  the  overall  proportion  of  children 
assigned to a SEN programme in a year group has no perceptible effect on the average 
performance of the year group. In other words, we can find no evidence for significant 
spillover effects.  
 
Overall, our analysis suggests that remediation programs are not working for a significant 
proportion of children known as ‘SEN’ and are not generating positive externalities on other 
children. Our results suggest that the mechanisms through which vulnerable children are 
helped needs to be reconsidered.   
 
There have been relatively few rigorous quantitative studies about the effects of ‘special 
needs programmes. This is probably on account of the difficulty of dealing with selection of 
pupils into these programmes. Our study shows how this difficulty can be overcome in the 
English  context.  While  inevitably  an  evaluation  of  a  ‘special  needs’  programme  in  one 
country does not necessarily have applicability in other countries, one general message is 
that well-intentioned programmes might even have negative effects due to the labelling of 
children. 
 
In  Section  II,  we  provide  an  overview  of  the  Special  Educational  Needs  Programme  in 
England. In Section III, we describe our data. Then in Section IV, we use a graphical analysis 
to  illustrate  inequality  in  access  to  SEN  resources  across  pupils  with  similar  learning 
difficulties.  In  Section  V,  we  use  a  graphical  and  regression  analysis  to  illustrate  the 
implications of this inequality for school performance at age 11. Section VI provides evidence 5 
 
on spillover effects. In Section VII, we discuss the interpretation of our findings. We conclude 
in Section VIII.  
 
 
2  Special Educational Needs Programme in England 
 
 
The current framework of special education in England was introduced about 30 years ago 
by the Education Act 1981. This Act introduced the legal concept of “special educational 
needs” (SEN) and emphasized the general principle of educating all children in mainstream 
schools.    
 
Generally  speaking,  SEN  programmes  consist  of  asking  schools  to  identify  pupils  with 
learning difficulties and to adapt their teaching strategies accordingly, as outlined in the 
Code of Practice. About 20% of English pupils participate in these programmes. The policy is 
led by a SEN coordinator, and the team receive resources from the school budget to achieve 
remediation targets that are specific to the school
5. Notionally SEN expenditure amounts to 
about 30% of the average spending per targeted pupil (about £1,320 on average). However, 
in practice schools have flexibility about how they spend SEN resources.  
 
The Special Educational Needs Code of Practice recommends a graduated approach to 
helping children who are in need of special provision. The first stages are at the discretion of 
the school (both in the identification of a student as having ‘special educational needs’ and 
in the type of provision given). The later stages involve the Local Authority, with the granting 
of a statement being reserved for the most serious cases (about 15% of the SEN population). 
The first type of programme is called ‘School Action’, which is when the school identifies a 
child as having ‘special educational needs’ and sets about providing an intervention that is 
additional to or different from that which is provided to the rest of the pupils. The Code of 
                                                 
5 The funding of schools is largely determined by pupil numbers and by the school’s level of deprivation. The 
formula  used  to  distribute  funds  to  schools  varies  between  Local  Authorities.  The  formula  typically  takes 
account of factors that are correlated with the probability of having special needs (e.g. economic deprivation 
indicators), but schools do not get specific additional funding whenever they assign a child to a SEN programme. 
They get additional funding only if the pupil has a statement of special needs. 6 
 
Practice  explains  that  the  triggers  for  this  level  of  intervention  could  be  one  of  several 
concerns  relating  to  the  child:  (a)  makes  little  or  no  progress  even  when  teaching 
approaches are targeted particularly at the child’s identified area of weakness; (b) shows 
signs of difficulty in developing literacy or mathematics skills which result in poor attainment 
in some curriculum areas; (c) presents persistent emotional or behavioural difficulties which 
are  not  ameliorated  by  the  behaviour  management  techniques  usually  employed  in  the 
school; (d) has sensory or physical problems and continues to make little or no progress 
despite  the provision  of  specialist  equipment; (e)  has  communication and/or  interaction 
difficulties  and  continues  to  make  little  or  no  progress  despite  the  provision  of  a 
differentiated curriculum. According to the Audit Commission (2002), in practice children 
with  needs  associated  with  a  physical  disability  tend  to  be  identified  earlier  and  more 
reliably. However, they note that most needs are not clear cut – for the majority, there are 
no  medical  tests  and  different  professionals  may  reach  differing  conclusions  about  the 
underlying causes for SEN. A report by the Schools Inspectorate (OfSTED, 2004) finds that 
there is wide variation between schools in the numbers defined as having SEN and that the 
criteria vary considerably in practice. There is no prescribed intervention strategy, but the 
Code of Practice gives some examples of strategies that might be deployed: one-to-one 
tuition; different learning materials or special equipment; group support; staff development 
and training to introduce more effective strategies for these students. It recommends that 
an Individual Education Plan should be made in relation to each child and used to assess 
progress in relation to targets.  
 
The next type of programme comes into place if ‘School Action’ is deemed inadequate. This 
is where the school seeks the help of external support services and is called ‘School Action 
Plus’.  The  specialist  might  act  in  an  advisory  capacity  or  provide  additional  specialist 
assessment or be involved in teaching the child directly. Finally, if all school action fails, the 
school  may  request  a  statutory  assessment,  which  may  lead  to  a  statement  of  special 
educational needs for the child.
6 This statement gives details of the nature of the child’s 
needs and how these will be provided for. It imposes a statutory duty on the Local Authority 
to  make  the  provision  set  out  in  the  statement.  Only  about  2.8%  of  pupils  get  a  SEN 
statement. 
                                                 
6 The child’s parent or guardian may also request a statutory assessment.  7 
 
 
Recently, Crawford and Vignoles (2010) evaluated the effectiveness of SEN provision in a 
region of the South West of England (Avon). They use a rich data set and a methodology 
based on statistical matching. They find no evidence that SEN provision raises educational 
attainment for the pupils in their sample. Keslair and McNally (2009) have also produced a 
descriptive study of SEN provision in England. Simple regression techniques show that the 
‘SEN’  label  continues  to  have  a  negative  association  with  pupil  outcomes  even  after 
controlling for a very rich set of controls. However, both these studies rely on ‘selection by 
observables’, which may be problematic as the selection process is not fully observable to 
the analyst. In our study, we try to apply techniques that overcome these problems. 
 
 
3  Data 
 
 
The  National  Pupil  Database  (NPD)  is  a  census  of  all  pupils  in  state  schools  in  England. 
Available since 2002, it includes measures of each pupil’s attainment in national tests, some 
personal information and school identifiers (which can then be linked to school-level data 
sets). The personal characteristics include gender, a measure of deprivation (whether the 
pupil is known to be eligible to receive Free School Meals), ethnicity, whether English is 
spoken  as  an  additional  language  and  whether  the  pupil  is  classified  as  having  Special 
Educational Needs (SEN). If the pupil is classified as having SEN, information is also provided 
on  SEN  type
7  (severe  learning  difficulties,  moderate  learning  difficulties  etc.)  and  the 
programme into which he/she is placed (School Action; School Action Plus; Statemented). 
 
In England, compulsory education is divided into various ‘Key Stages’, after which there is a 
national test. In primary school, ‘Key Stage 1’ tests are taken at age 7 and ‘Key Stage 2’ tests 
are taken at age 11.
8 The tests are set and marked externally to the school. As there is no 
                                                 
7 This information is only available for the  last two cohorts 
8 In recent years, the test at age 7 has been replaced by teacher assessment. However, the cohorts considered in 
this paper all took the test at this age.  8 
 
grade repetition in the English system, all children within the year group (or grade) are born 
within a year of each other. 
 
In this paper, we use information available on all pupils observed in the NPD at age 11 (i.e. 
the  final  year  of  primary  school)  between  2002  and  2008.  For  each  pupil,  we  have 
information on his/her result at the national test taken at age 7
9 (Key-stage 1, hereafter 
KS1), his/her SEN status during the current academic year, as well as his/her result at the 
national test taken at the end of the academic year (Key stage 2, hereafter KS2). For each 
child, we can construct the average KS1 results of the other pupils in his/her school and year 
group (because we know the school identification number of each pupil).  
 
It is important to note that all children have to take national tests in English, Maths and 
Science at KS2 and (up to recently) in English and Maths at KS1. This applies to most children 
who have special needs, which is one very interesting feature of the English evaluation 
system.
10 This is not the case in the US for instance, where existing evaluati ons of special 
education programmes have to address the difficult issue of selection into national tests 
(only a selected subsample of SEN students undertake the tests).  
 
Within  this  framework,  our  first  main  question  is  to  ask  whether  school  context  (as 
measured by peers’ average KS1) has an effect on SEN assignment and whether this effect is 
significantly stronger for pupils with moderate difficulties early on in primary school (i.e. low-
medium KS1 at age 7). The second main question is to ask whether we observe similar 
variation in the effect of school context on pupils’ performance at KS2, which would be 
consistent with SEN assignment having an impact on subsequent performance.  We then 
move on to an analysis where we investigate whether the proportion of pupils assigned to a 
SEN programme has an impact on the entire year group (a combination of any direct effect 
and a spillover effect).  
 
                                                 
9We derive a composite score for Key Stage 1 based on tests in reading, writing and maths. There are six 
possible levels on each of these tests (0, 1, 2C, 2B, 2A, 3, 4). We assign a score to each of the six levels (0-6) 
and then sum across the three subjects.   
10 While some children can be exempt from these tests, this is only true for a small minority of children in our 
data sets. We have excluded ‘special schools’ from the analysis – where children with very severe levels of need 
are often placed.  9 
 
 
4  School Contexts and Distribution of SEN Resources Within Year Groups 
 
 
Although all schools are likely to classify pupils with more obvious needs as having ‘special 
educational needs’, there is plenty of scope for judgment to differ for the many less obvious 
cases. In fact, the detection of learning difficulties is likely to depend on what is considered 
‘normal’ and this is likely to vary a lot between schools, a higher yardstick being applied in 
schools where average performance is higher. Of course, children of low enough ability will 
plausibly be assigned to a SEN programme regardless of the average performance of their 
peers whereas children of high enough ability will never be assigned to a SEN programme. 
However, significant variation across school context is likely to occur for pupils with less 
serious learning difficulties.  
 
To test this assumption, Figure 1a  shows variation across school context (denoted C) in the 
relationship between a child’s score at age 7 (KS1) and his/her probability of being assigned 
to a SEN programme (i.e., E(T | KS1, C), where T is a dummy indicating access to a SEN 
programme). For each school, the ‘school context’ is defined by the mean of the pupils’ test 
score distribution at age 7. Figure 1a distinguishes between quartiles of the distribution of 
this variable across schools.  
 
Interestingly, Figure 1a confirms that highly able pupils (measured at age 7) are almost never 
assigned to a SEN programme, regardless of the school context. Also, those at the bottom of 
the  ability  distribution  will  be  assigned  to  a  SEN  programme  in  all  school  contexts.  In 
contrast, for those in-between the two extremes, there is a substantial gap between the 
probability of being assigned to a SEN programme in a high context school compared to a 
low context school. For example, when we focus on a pupil with a score of 5 at age 7
11, we 
find that the gap between the probability of being assigned to the SEN programme is more 
than 20 percentage points higher in top -quartile schools than in bottom -quartile schools 
(see Figure 1b).  
 
                                                 
11 A score of 5 corresponds to the average score of SEN pupils at age 7. 10 
 
A  higher  probability  of  being  assigned  to  a  SEN  programme  does  not  necessarily  mean 
greater access to SEN resources. It may well be that schools which assign more children to 
SEN programmes commit less resources per SEN pupil. In such a case, the gap across schools 
in the SEN assignment probability for pupils with moderate difficulties does not necessarily 
correspond to a gap in access to SEN resources. To address this issue, we have matched our 
dataset  to  an  administrative  database  which  provides  information  on  the  average 
expenditure per SEN pupil for each school. Using this, we construct a variable (ti) which takes 
the value of average SEN expenditure per pupil (in the pupil’s school) in the case when 
he/she is on a SEN programme and takes the value zero otherwise. It is reassuring to see 
(Figure 2) that school context has exactly the same effect on this measure of exposure to 
SEN programmes as on the SEN assignment probability. The reason is that school context has 
no specific effect on the level of SEN expenditure per pupil. The expenditure per pupil on 
SEN is slightly higher in in low-context schools than in high-context schools, but the gap is 
relatively small (about 5%-6%) and importantly, is not different for pupils with moderate 
difficulties early on in primary schools than it is for other pupils. Thus a higher probability of 





5  School Contexts and Distribution of Performances Within Year Groups 
 
 
Overall, the highly decentralized nature of SEN policy gives rise to very significant variation 
across school context in the distribution of SEN resources within year groups.  The next 
important question is whether this variation in the distribution of remediation resources is 
associated with corresponding variation in the distribution of performance at the end of 
primary school.  
 
                                                 
12Formally, we have, E(t | KS1, C)≡ E(t | KS1, C, T =1) × E(T | KS1, C). Hence, if context C has no effect on 
average expenditure for pupils on SEN (as measured by E(t | KS1, C, T =1)), then it necessarily has the same 
impact on average expenditure E(t  |  KS1, C) and the assignment probability E(T  | KS1, C)).   
 11 
 
Figures 3a-3b provide a simple test for this hypothesis by comparing the effect of school 
context  on  the  distribution  of  SEN  assignment  probability  and  on  the  distribution  of 
performance at age 11 across pupils with different age 7 test scores. For the sake of clarity, 
we distinguish between only two school contexts: a school is classified as “high context” 
when its pupils’ average test score at age 7 is above the median of the distribution across 
schools. These Figures confirm the very strong effect of school context on SEN assignment 
for low-medium ability pupils, but reveal that it does not correspond to any shift in academic 
performance at age 11. Although “high school context” is associated with slightly better 
performance at age 11, the effect is neither more or less important for low-medium ability 
pupils  than  for  the  other  pupils.    In  fact,  we  observe  the  same  smooth  quasi-linear 
relationship between scores at age 7 and scores at age 11 in both contexts (with a one point 
increase in age 7 scores being associated with a two point increase in age 11 scores).  
 
As a robustness test, Figures A1 and A2 in the Appendix replicate these graphs when we 
compare schools in the top and bottom deciles of the distribution of average scores at age 7. 
The first stage shift in the effect of school context on the probability of being assigned to 
SEN (for low-medium ability pupils) is much larger with this specification. However, we do 
not find stronger evidence of any positive shift in the effect of school context on test scores 
at  age  11.  If  anything, the  variation  in  the  effect  of  school  context  on  age  11  scores  is 
negative (though not statistically significant). 
 
As  additional  specification  tests,  we  have  constructed  similar  graphs  comparing  pupils 
attending schools in the 1
st and 2
nd quartiles of the distribution of mean KS1 across schools 
as well as pupils attending schools in the 3
rd and 4
th quartiles. When we compare the 1
st and 
2
nd quartile, the impact of school context on SEN assignment is at a maximum for KS1=4, 
whereas the mode is at about KS1=6 when we compare the 3
rd and 4
th quartiles (available on 
request). But in both cases, the effect of school context on KS2 results remains small and 
does not show any positive peak for low-medium ability pupils. This further confirms that a 
significant increase in the SEN assignment probability is not associated with any increase in 
subsequent performance, regardless of whether we focus on pupils in schools above or 
below  the median of average ability.  
 12 
 
Generally speaking, our Figures suggest that there is no net effect of being assigned to SEN 
programmes on the educational performance of pupils with moderate difficulties compared 
to  other  pupils  in  the  same  year  group.  This  interpretation  relies  on  the  identifying 
assumption that the specific increase in the SEN assignment probability for children with 
low-medium ability in high-context schools does not relate to any confounding variation in 
pre-assignment characteristics.  Figure 4 does not reveal any such confounding variation in 
observed pre-assignment characteristics. For example, it does not show any specific peak in 
the difference across school contexts in the probability of being eligible to receive Free 





To  further  explore  the  robustness  of  the  relationship  between  SEN  assignment,  school 
context and early ability, we estimate the following regression,  
 
(1)  i i i s i i s i i s i u d X C c KS C b KS C a SEN 1 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 6 1 ) 7 1 3 ( 1           
 
where SEN6i is a dummy indicating SEN assignment at age 11 (year 6), Cs(i) is a school context 
dummy indicating whether person i attends a school s(i)  in the top half of the test score 
distribution at age 7, whereas KS1i represents the score of person i at age 7 and Xi  is a set of 
control variables which includes a full set of 14 dummies indicating the score at age 7 (i.e. 
1(KS1i=k) for k=1,…14). The parameter of interest is a1 which captures the specific effect of 
school context on the assignment probability of pupils with low-medium ability at age 7. 
Table 2 shows the results of this first-stage regression, which confirm that pupils of low-
medium ability have a significantly higher probability of being assigned to a SEN programme 
in high context schools. The estimated difference in SEN assignment is about 5.6 percentage 
points and this first-stage estimate is not influenced by adding controls for attainment at age 
7, school context, gender, ethnicity, Free School meal status or a dummy indicating that 
English is second language at home (column 2). Also it is unchanged when we further control 
for  school  fixed  effects  (column  3),  which  confirms  that  observed  variation  in  SEN 13 
 
assignment across school contexts is not driven by school unobserved heterogeneity. First 
stage estimates are all highly significant at standard levels across specifications.   
   
Table  2  also  shows  the  results  of  the  corresponding  reduced-form  regressions  of 
performance at age 11 (KS2i) on the same set of explanatory variables as in Eq. (1):  
 
(2)  i i i s i i s i i s i u d X C c KS C b KS C a KS 2 2 ) ( 2 ) ( 2 ) ( 2 1 ) 7 1 3 ( 1 2           
 
The results confirm that the relative (age 11) performance of pupils with low-medium ability 
is not larger in high context schools. The estimated reduced-form effect is actually small and 
negative (about -2% of a SD). It does not vary significantly across specifications, although it 
becomes marginally significant when we control for both individual observed heterogeneity 
and  school  fixed  effects.    Overall,  Table  2  provides  results  that  are  consistent  with  the 
previous graphical analysis: pupils of low-medium ability have a higher probability of being 
assigned to a SEN programme in high context schools, but no higher test scores at KS2.  
 
To take this one step further, Table 3 shows the results of the corresponding OLS and IV 
regressions of SEN assignment on performance at age 11,  
 
(3)  i i i s i i s i i u d X C c KS C b SEN a KS 3 3 ) ( 3 ) ( 3 6 3 1 2        
 
where the IV regressions uses the interaction between school context and whether the pupil 
has an age 7 test score in the range from 3 to 7 as an instrumental variable (i.e. Z= Cs(i) ×1(3≤ 
KS1i≤7)).  The identifying assumption is simply that the effect of school context (Cs(i)) on the 
test score at the end of primary school (KS2i) is neither particularly strong nor particularly 
weak for pupils who have a test score at age 7 in the range of 3 to 7, i.e. the very children for 
whom we find school context to be a key determinant of access to the SEN programme. Let 
us emphasize that we do not constrain the effect of school context to be the same for pupils 
with low and high ability (the effect may indeed vary monotonically across ability levels). The 
only  restriction  is  that  there  is  no  specific  peak  in  this  effect  for  pupils  with  moderate 
learning difficulties at age 7. 14 
 
 
The OLS results show that pupils involved in a SEN programme have a test score at age 11 
which is about one third of a standard deviation lower than other pupils. It is consistent with 
the  assumption  that  selection  into  a  SEN  programme  is  based  in  part  on  unobservable 
characteristics  that  are  negatively  associated  with  school  performance.  The  IV  strategy 
plausibly removes these selection effects and yields a causal estimate of the effect of SEN 
programmes  on  age  11  test  scores.  As  expected  from  first-stage  and  reduced-form 
estimates, the IV estimate is negative, small (about -5% of a SD) and not very precisely 
estimated. It becomes marginally significant at standard levels when we control for both 
observed individual heterogeneity and school fixed effects.  
 
Note  that  this  causal  effect  is  identified  for  pupils  who  are  likely  to  have  moderate 
difficulties (i.e. whether they are placed on a SEN programme is sensitive to school context) 
but  not  for  pupils  who  would  always  be  placed  on  a  SEN  programme  (i.e.  very  severe 
difficulties that involve assignment to a SEN programme in all school contexts). Our results 
suggest that students with moderate difficulties do not benefit from being involved in the 





The approach developed in this paper sheds light on whether SEN assignment during the last 
year of primary school (i.e. age 11) has an impact on school performance at the end of this 
year (i.e. Year 6) using variation in assignment across school contexts (at age 11) as a source 
of identification.  It is worth emphasising, however, that a small fraction of children are on a 
SEN programme at age 10 but not on a SEN programme at age 11. It may be that our 
specification does not capture the effect of SEN assignment on these children. To address 
this issue, it is possible to focus on the effect of SEN assignment the year before Year 6 (i.e. 
age  10)  on  performance  at  KS2  using  variation  in  assignment  across  school  contexts 
observed  at  age  10  (i.e.  the  mean  KS1  scores  of  peers  at  age  10)  as  a  source  of 15 
 
identification
13. We have checked that this specification produces exactly the same results as 
the basic one (see Figure A3 in the appendix).  
 
Another possible specification test involves focusing on the effect of SEN assignment in any 
year between age 7 and 11, and then using variation in assignment across school context at 
age 7 as a source of identification.
14  Again, the results are very similar.  
 
 
6  Spillover Effects of SEN Programmes Across Year Groups 
 
 
In the previous section, we have found that variation in the difference in performance at Key 
Stage 2 between mid and low ability students (or between high and mid-ability students) is 
largely unrelated to exogenous variation in the difference in exposure to SEN programmes 
between  these  students.  This  finding  suggests  that,  within  a  given  school  context,  SEN 
programmes  have  no  significant  effect  on  the  relative  performance  of  students  who 
participate in these programmes compared to other students.   
 
However,  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  SEN  programmes  have  no  effect  at  all  on 
students’ outcomes. In particular, it still remains possible that SEN programmes jointly affect 
treated  and  non-treated  pupils,  i.e.  have  direct  effects  on  treated  pupils  and  indirect 
spillover effects on non-treated students. In such a case, a SEN programme may have no 
perceptible effect on the relative performance of treated students compared to the other 
students in the same year group, but have a significant effect on the overall performance of 
the year group.  
 
There are several channels through which a SEN programme may induce spillover effects. On 
the one hand, given that SEN programmes are not associated with increases in the school 
budget, any new SEN programme (or any increase in the size of the existing programme) is 
                                                 
13 When we use this strategy, we have to exclude the 2002 cohort since the data does not include this cohort 
when at age 10.  
14 When we use this strategy, we have to focus on the 2006 cohort only, since it is the only one for which we 
observe SEN assignment each year between the age of 7 and 11. 16 
 
likely to be associated with a decline in the level of resources allocated to non-SEN pupils, 
which may be detrimental to these pupils. If teachers have to spend more time with SEN 
pupils, the number of hours spent with non-SEN pupils will decrease.
15 On the other hand, 
we cannot exclude the possibility that the help provided to low-ability pupils in a year group 
has a positive effect on the overall performance of the year group. In particular, it may be 
that the overall quality of teaching will be improved by SEN programmes. Teachers may 
spend fewer hours with non-SEN pupils, but if these hours are less disrupted by SEN pupils 
with behavioural problems, we may observe positive spillover effects on non -SEN pupils (if 
only because the class of non -SEN pupils keep on working while SEN pupils are attending 
their particular courses). Overall, SEN programmes might well generate spillover effects on 
non-SEN pupils, although the sign and magnitude of these effects are difficult to predict.  
 
In this Section we do not provide a separate identification of direct and spillover effects, but 
provide an evaluation of the overall effect of SEN programmes – bearing in mind that this is 
likely to be a combination of direct and spillover effects.  Specifically, we deliver an analysis 
at the level of the year group. We analyse the effect of the proportion of pupils assigned to a 
SEN  programme  on  the  average  performance  of  pupils.  The  estimated  effect  can  be 
understood as a reduced-form impact at the year-group level. 
 
With respect to identification, we need to isolate a source of variation in the proportion of 
SEN pupils in a year group which has no direct effect on the performance of this year group.  
To address this issue, we build on demographic shocks which affect the other year groups in 
the same school. As discussed below, these shocks directly affect the proportion of SEN 
pupils in these other year groups, while also having an indirect effect on the proportion of 
SEN pupils in the year group under consideration. This is due to school-level constraints in 
the overall size of the SEN programme. Under the maintained assumption that demographic 
shocks in other year groups do not have any direct effect on the performance of the year 
group under consideration, this provides an interesting tool for identifying the overall effect 
of the proportion of SEN pupils in a year group on their average performance. Under the 
weaker assumption that adverse shocks in other year groups also reduce access to other 
                                                 
15 Cullen (1997) provides evidence that special education needs programmes may detract from spending on 
regular education students.  17 
 
school resources (i.e. not just to SEN resources), this strategy provides an upper bound for 
the effect of the SEN programme. 
 
 
Spillover effects of SEN assignments across year groups 
 
Existing qualitative evidence and official regulations imply a couple of basic features about 
the process of pupil assignment to a SEN programme. First, the overall level of resources 
allocated to SEN in a given school is to a large extent determined at the school level and 
stable over time. For example, there is typically only one SEN coordinator per school and the 
contribution of this key input does not vary substantially from one year to the other. Given 
these school level constraints, the amount of SEN resources allocated to a specific year 
group at a given time is likely to depend not only on the proportion of pupils with learning 
difficulties  within  this  year  group,  but  also  on  the  proportion  of  pupils  with  learning 
difficulties in other year groups within the same school. In particular, if the year group who 
entered into school s at date t0 is followed at date t0+1 by a year group with a relatively high 
proportion of pupils with learning difficulties, then the year group who entered at t0 will 
undergo  a  more  severe  competition  for  holding  on  to  SEN  resources  during  the  five 
subsequent years after t0+1. Consequently, this year group is likely to have relatively low 
access to these resources.  
 
To provide a test for the assumption that younger year groups influence the SEN resources 
allocated  to  older  year  groups  within  schools,  we  need  an  instrumental  variable  which 
affects the proportion of SEN pupils in the younger year groups, but which is unrelated to 
the other potential determinants of SEN resources in the older year groups. One possible 
candidate is the proportion of pupils born in August
16 within the younger year groups. In the 
English system, pupils born in August are the youngest in  their year group and it has long 
been established that the least mature children within a given year group are also the most 
exposed to early learning difficulties.
17  Within the English context, a year group with a 
                                                 
16 We have tried to use other aspects of the distribution of month of birth within the younger age group (such as 
mean month of birth), but the proportion August born has the strongest first-stage effects. 
17  See, for example, Crawford et al. (2007) for England. 18 
 
relatively high proportion of August born children is likely to be a year group with a relatively 
high proportion of pupils with learning difficulties and, consequently, a year group with a 
relatively high proportion of SEN pupils. Under the maintained assumption that this is the 
only channel through which the proportion of August born pupils in a year group affects the 
proportion of SEN pupils within older year groups, the proportion of August born pupils 
within  a  year  group  can  be  used  as  an  instrument  to  identify  spillover  effects  in  SEN 
assignment across year groups. Specifically, if  t s k SEN , , denotes the proportion of SEN pupils 
in grade k, school s at date t. Table 4 reports the results of the IV regressions of  t s SEN , , 6  on 
t s SEN , , 5  
(4)   t s st t s t s X SEN SEN , , 1 , 6 , , 5 , , 6         
 
where we use three alternative sets of control variables
18  st X , 6  and where the spillover 
effect α is identified using the proportion ( t s August , , 5 ) of pupils born in August observed in 
grade 5 and school s at date t as an instrumental variable.  To start with,  the two first 
columns  of  Table  4  show  the  results  of  the  first  stage  regressions  of  t s SEN , , 5   on 
t s August , , 5 which confirms that the proportion of  pupils assigned to a SEN programme in a 
year group is very significantly affected by the proportion of pupils born late within the year, 
even when we focus on the last grades of primary school. The estimated effect does not vary 
significantly across specifications and suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in the 
proportion of August born pupils in a year group is associated with a 0.3 percentage point 
increase in the proportion of SEN pupils in this year group.  
 
Most interestingly, columns (3) and (4) show that  t s August , , 5  has also a significant reduced-
form effect on   t s SEN , , 6   the proportion of SEN pupils observed in the older year group. 
Again, the estimated effect is stable across specifications. It suggests that a 10 percentage 
point  increase  in  the  proportion  of  August  born  children  in  the  younger  year  group  is 
associated with a decrease of about 0.17 percentage points in the proportion of SEN in the 
                                                 
18In baseline specification, we only control for school context (as measured by four dummies indicating the 
proportion of low KS1 pupils within school s over the period under consideration) whereas the second 
specification controls for the size of the year group, various other school-level characteristics including the 
proportion of low KS1 pupils in year group 6 in school s at date t  19 
 
older  year  group.  The  stability  of  this  effect  across  specifications  suggests  that  the 
instrument is not correlated with the other observed determinants of SEN in the older year 
group.  In  Appendix  B,  we  report  additional  regressions  (using  the  same  specifications) 
providing direct evidence on the fact that the instrument used in this analysis is not related 
to the main control variables.  In particular, there is no significant association between the 
proportion of August born pupils in the younger year group and the proportion of pupils 
with low Key Stage 1 results in the older year group.  
 
Finally, columns (5) and (6) show the corresponding IV regressions of  t s SEN , , 6  on  t s SEN , , 5   
using  August5,s,t  as  an  instrument.  They  provide  estimates  for  the  parameter  which  are 
significant and consistent with previous first-stage and reduced-form analysis. They suggest 
that a 10 percentage point increase in the proportion of SEN pupils in year group 5 causes a 
reduction of 5 percentage points in the proportion of SEN pupils in year group 6.  
 
Overall, our data suggest that there are significant spillover effects from SEN assignment 
across  year  groups.  In  the  next  subsection,  we  build  on  this  externality  to  provide  an 
evaluation of the effect of the proportion of pupils assigned to a SEN programme in a year 
group on the average performance of pupils in this year group.  
  
 
Proportion of SEN pupils and year group average performance  
 
Because of school-level constraints on SEN assignment, the proportion of August born pupils 
in a  year group significantly affects the proportion of SEN pupils in the older year group. The 
next question is whether it also affects average performance for the older year group. To 
test this assumption, Table 5 reports the results of regressing the average performance at 
KS2 of year group 6 in school s at date t (denoted KS26,s,t) on the proportion of August born 
pupils in year group 5 at the same date in the same school, 
 
(5)    t s st t s t s X August KS , , 2 , 6 , , 5 , , 6 2       ,  
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using  the  same  set  of  alternative  specifications  as  in  Table  4.  Variable  t s KS , , 6 2   is 
standardized with mean 50 and standard deviation 10. The estimate of the reduced-form 
effect  
of proportion of August born pupils on attainment at KS2 is stable across specifications and 
is positively signed (although not statistically significant).  
Table 5 also shows the corresponding IV regressions of   t s KS , , 6 2  on  t s SEN , , 6 , 
 
(6)    t s st t s t s X SEN KS , , 3 , 6 , , 6 , , 6 2        
 
where August5,s,t is used as an instrument to identify the year-group level effect γ. It provides 
an evaluation of the effect of the proportion of SEN pupils in a year group on the average 
performance of this year group, under the maintained assumption that the proportion of 
August born pupils in a year group affects the average performance of older year groups 
only  through  its  spillover  effect  on  SEN  assignment  in  these  year  groups.  Given  the 
normalization used, the point estimates suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in the 
proportion of SEN pupils in a given year group is associated with a decrease of about 13% of 
a  SD  in  the  average  performance  at  KS2.  However,  the  effects  are  not  significant  at 
conventional levels (i.e. they are only significant at the 20% level). Nonetheless, they suggest 
that positive effects can be ruled out.  
 
To take this one step further, we have replicated the regression analysis by focusing on SEN 
assignment and average KS2 performance of the subgroup of high-ability pupils (KS1 above 
11). As expected the instrument August5,s,t  has no effect on SEN assignment for this sub-
group (see Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6), which confirms that the instrument affects the 
proportion  of  SEN  pupils  in  year  group  6  only  because  it  affects  the  probability  of  SEN 
assignment for low and mid-ability pupils
19. Given this fact, any effect of the instr ument 
August5,s,t  on the average performance at KS2 of high-ability pupils may be interpreted as   
the pure spillover effect of the programme on these pupils. As shown by Columns 3 to 6 of 
Table 6, we do not find any such spillover effect. Overall, SEN programmes have had no 
                                                 
19The sample used in Table 6 is slightly different than the sample used in Tables 4 or 5 due to a small subset of 
schools having no high-ability pupils. 21 
 
significant effect on the relative performance of treated pupils and no significant spillover 
effects on the performance of untreated pupils.    
 
 
7  Discussion 
 
 
Overall, our findings suggest that the programme for Special Educational Needs in England is 
ineffective  for pupils  with moderate  difficulties  early  on  in primary  school.  As  discussed 
above, a key feature of the programme is its high degree of decentralization. Building on the 
existing literature in psychology and education as well as on official reports, this Section 
discusses the potential failures of such a system.  
 
To begin with, it is often hypothesised in the literature that being labelled as having special 
needs has stigmatizing effects on pupils (compared to similar pupils who are not labelled), 
which  may  generate  low  self-esteem  and  worsen  subsequent  outcomes.  Analyzing  a 
longitudinal survey of about 8,000 American pupils and using Propensity Score Matching 
techniques, Morgan et al. (2008) confirm that pupils with a relatively low ex ante probability 
of  being  placed  into  special  education  (but  who  nevertheless  were  so  placed)  more 
frequently displayed subsequent problems of self-esteem, sadness and anxiety. Also, they 
found that these pupils displayed significantly lower reading and mathematical skills at the 
end of primary school than closely matched peers who did not receive special education 
services. In fact, one issue with being labelled as SEN may be that it makes pupils (and 
families) attribute causes of low performance to low intrinsic ability rather than to lack of 
effort. As it happens, modern theories of cognition argue that the propensity to attribute 
causes of negative outcomes (such as failure at school) to stable self-referent terms (such as 
low personal ability) is  a determinant of depression and hopelessness (Abramson et al., 
1978). Using a sample of about 1,800 Norwegian pupils and Path Analysis techniques, Valas 
(2001) confirms that children who attribute the causes of failure at school to ability rather 
than to effort have on average lower self-esteem, expect less from increased efforts in the 
future and perform less well at school. 
 22 
 
Another general issue with labelling children as having SEN is that it can change teachers’ 
perceptions and expectations (see Fogel and Nelson, 1983). According to a recent report of 
English School Inspectorates (OfSTED, 2004), lack of expectation is actually one important 
reason for why pupils on SEN make too little progress. The report argues that in six out of 
ten  primary  and  secondary  school  visited,  expectations  of  improvement  in  reading  and 
writing were too low.   
 
Another general criticism is that labelling specific children as “special needs” often induces 
schools to treat them separately and differently rather than to adapt the regular class (Ho, 
2004). A report by the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA, 2004) confirms that 
‘when a child is identified as having SEN, a whole set of processes and structures come into 
operation. While these may be valuable in bringing a rigour to planning and possibly extra 
resources, they also imply a separateness that can be unhelpful. For example, the presence 
of a learning support assistant may mean that the class teacher gives less attention to a child 
with SEN’. Similar problems are emphasized by OfSTED (2004) who reports that SEN pupils 
are  kept  out  of  the  main  class  for  too  much  of  the  day,  isolated  from  their  peers  and 
deprived of access to a broad curriculum and the classroom teacher. 
 
Additional problems may also come from the highly decentralized nature of this type policy 
and lack of central monitoring and regulations. As discussed in this paper, it generates strong 
inequalities in the probability of treatment across children with similar learning difficulties, 
but it may also be one explanation for why the teaching of pupils with SEN is of varying 
quality and not necessarily adequate. The Audit Commission (2002) confirms that ‘a lack of 
systematic monitoring by schools and Local Education Authorities means that poor practice 
may go unchallenged’. Their survey found that only half of Local Education Authorities were 
systematically monitoring schools’ work on SEN. The report also suggests that one of the 
reasons  why  schools  and  Local  Education  Authorities  have  difficulty  analyzing  the 
performance of children with SEN is a lack of national benchmarks for children with learning 
difficulties. Similar conclusions are reported by OfSTED (2004), which also finds that few 
schools evaluate their provision for pupils with SEN systematically. More recent research 
reported by Wilkins (2008) finds that only 47 per cent of Local (Education) Authorities detail 
the help they are providing for SEN children on their websites and only 27 percent explain 23 
 
the funding of School Action and School Action Plus; only 29 percent of authorities explained 
how they monitored the effectiveness of SEN spending (another legal requirement). OfSTED 
(2004) suggest that lack of provision of appropriate data at Local Authority level means that 
they  cannot  easily  compare  how  well  they  are  doing  with  the  lowest-attaining  pupils 




8  Conclusion 
 
 
Remediation programmes are difficult to evaluate because the selection process is not fully 
observed  by  analysts  and  those  pupils  who  are  selected  are  likely  to  be  relatively  low 
achievers.  In  this  paper,  we  build  on  the  highly  decentralized  nature  of  the  Special 
Educational  Needs  programme  in  England  to  evaluate  whether  increased  access  to  the 
programme for a year group, or for a group of pupils within a year group, is accompanied by 
an increase in the relative performance of this year group or this group of pupils. 
 
We first demonstrate that the probability of assignment to a SEN programme is much more 
sensitive to school context for the group of children with low-mid ability than for  other 
children.  Specifically  the  group  of  pupil  with  low-mid  ability  will  have  a  relatively  high 
probability of being placed on a SEN programme in a ‘high context’ school (i.e. where the 
average ability of peers is higher), but a relatively low probability in a ‘low context’ school.  
Secondly, we show that this variation in the relative probability of SEN assignment does not 
translate into variation in the relative performance of the group of children with low-mid 
ability  compared  to  other  children  within  the  same  year  group.  This  suggests  that  SEN 
programmes have no effect on relative performance for the marginal pupil with moderate 
learning difficulties compared to  other pupils within the same year group.  
 
One possible reason for why we see no effect may be that other children in the same year 
group are indirectly affected by the SEN programme. In particular, high ability pupils might 
indirectly  benefit  from  low-mid  ability  pupils  being  put  into  a  SEN  programme  if  this 24 
 
improves the quality of the class (e.g. if more SEN students are taken out of the classroom 
and this includes some additional badly behaved pupils). In such a case, SEN programmes 
could improve the average performance of all pupils in the year group, even though they do 
not  necessarily  improve  the  relative  performance  of  the  treated.  The  second  main 
contribution  of  the  paper  is  to  test  for  such  year  group  effects,  using  exogenous 
demographic shocks that affect the distribution of SEN resources across the different year 
groups. Specifically, we build on the fact that an unusually large fraction of relatively young 
pupils within a year group (i.e. a relatively large fraction of August born pupils) increases the 
probability of SEN assignment for this  year group, but decreases it for the other year groups 
in the same school (because of overall budget constraints).  Under the assumption that this 
type of shock affects other year groups only through the reallocation of SEN resources, we 
are able to use the proportion of relatively young children in a year group as an instrument 
for identifying the impact of the proportion of SEN students in the other year groups. As it 
turns out, this analysis rules out positive effects at the year group level – confirming that the 
SEN policy has, at best, a negligible overall impact.  
 
Overall, the different parts of our analysis suggest that SEN policies are not effective in 
achieving their stated aims. Therefore the ways in which vulnerable children are helped by 
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Note: For each KS1 score, the full line ‘Q1’ shows the probability of SEN assignment for pupils attending schools 
in the top quartile of the distribution of average KS1. The three other lines show the probability of SEN 
assignment for the three other quartiles. 
 
Figure 1b: Test Scores at Age 7 and the Difference across School Contexts in the Probability 
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Note: For each KS1 score, the full line ‘Q1-Q4’ shows the difference in the probability of SEN assignment 
between pupils attending schools in the top quartile (Q1) of the distribution of average KS1 and pupils 
attending schools in the bottom quartile (Q4). The two other lines show the difference between second and 
fourth quartile and between third and fourth quartile. 28 
 
Figure 2: Test Scores at Age 7 and the Difference across School Contexts in SEN 
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Test Score Age 7 (KS1)
Q1-Q4 Q2-Q4 Q3-Q4
 
Note: For each KS1 score, the full line ‘Q1-Q4’ shows the difference in the conditional average expenditure per 
pupil between pupils attending schools in the top quartile (Q1) of the distribution of average KS1 and pupils 
attending schools in the bottom quartile (Q4). The two other lines show the difference between the second 
and fourth quartile and between the third and fourth quartile. 29 
 
Figure 3a: Variation in Performance at Age 11 (KS2) and probability of SEN Assignment 
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KS2-low KS2-high SEN-low SEN-high
 
Note: For each KS1 score, the ‘KS2-low’ (resp. ‘KS2-high’) line shows the average performance at age 11 of 
pupils attending schools above (below) the median of the distribution of average KS1. Symmetrically, the ‘SEN-
low’ (resp. ‘SEN-high’) line shows the probability of SEN assignment at age 11 of pupils attending schools above 




Figure 3b: Test score at Age 7 and the Difference across School Contexts in the Probability 
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 Note: For each KS1 score, the full bold line shows the difference in the probability of SEN assignment between 
pupils attending schools above the median of the distribution of average KS1 and pupils attending schools 
below the median. The dotted bold line shows the difference in the performance at age 11 between pupils 
attending schools above the median of the distribution of average KS1 and pupils attending schools below the 
median. For each bold line, the two thin dotted lines show confidence intervals. 31 
 
 
Figure 4: Test Score at Age 7 and the Difference across School Contexts in the Probability 
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Free School meals Male English as a second language
 
Note: For each KS1 score, the full bold line shows the difference in the probability of Free School Meals 
between pupils attending schools above the median of the distribution of average KS1 and pupils attending 
schools below the median. The two other lines show difference in proportion of male students and difference 
in the proportion of students having English as a second language. 
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Table 1 : Descriptive statistics 
 














Panel A : Full sample       
KS2 (score)  50 (10)  52.45 (8.7)  47.62 (10.2) 
KS1 (score)  9.37 (3.7)  10.46 (3.4)  8.20 (3.7) 
SEN   0.23 (0.42)  0.17 (0.38)  0.28 (0.45) 
Mean KS1  9.36 (1.45)  10.41 (0.81)  8.03 (1.00) 
Free School Meals    0.16 (0.37)  0.08 (0.28)  0.24 (0.43) 
English as additional language 
(EAL) 
0.09 (0.28)  0.05 (0.21)  0.13 (0.34) 
Support staff expenditure per SEN 
pupil (£) 
1320  1289  1360 
 
Number of observations  3,767,550  1,951,223  1,816,327 
Number of schools  14,345  7,172  7,173 
 








KS1 (score)  5.39 (3.1)  6.31 (3.2)  4.79 (2.9) 
Free School Meal   0.27 (0.44)  0.16 (0.36)  0.34 (0.47) 
English as an additional language 
(EAL) 
0.08 (0.27)  0.04 (0.19)  0.11 (0.31) 
Treatment duration (in years)
20  3.37 (0.95)  3.30 (0.92)  3.42 (0.93) 
Number of observations  886,971  350,886  536,085 
 
Notes. Standard deviations in brackets.  
 
                                                 
20 This data is available only for the 2006 cohort and relates to SEN treatment from YG3 onwards. 33 
 




   
Dependent variables : 
 
  SEN assignment (first stage)    KS2 score (reduced form) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
















































































               
 
Note: All models include a set of 7 cohort dummies (from 2002 to 2008) and a set of 15 KS1 dummies (from 
KS1=1 to 15). Additional controls include dummies for eligibility to receive free school meals; whether English 
is spoken as an additional language; gender; as well as interactions of these controls with a dummy indicating 
school type (i.e. a dummy indicating that the average KS1 is above the median of the distribution of average KS1 
across  schools).  As  KS2  standard deviation  is  10,  a  coefficient  of  1  on  SEN  assignment  indicates  that  the 
programme raise pupil achievement by one tenth of a standard deviation.  34 
 




   
Dependant variables : KS2 score 
 
  IV regressions    OLS regressions 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
 












































































               
 
Note: All models include a set of 7 cohort dummies (from 2002 to 2008) and a set of 15 KS1 dummies (from 
KS1=1 to  15).  Additional  controls  include  dummies  for whether  a  pupil  receives free  school  meals, speaks 
English as a second language, gender, as well as interactions of these controls with a dummy indicating school 
type (i.e., a dummy indicating that the average KS1 is above the median of the distribution of average KS1 
across  schools).  As  KS2  standard  deviation  is  10,  a  coefficient  of  1  on  SEN  assignment  indicates  that  the 
program raise pupils achievement by one tenth of a standard deviation.  35 
 
Table 4: The Effect of the Proportion of SEN Pupils in Year Group 5 on the Proportion of 
SEN Pupils in Year Group 6. 
 
  Dependant variables: 
 
  Prop. SEN Pupils in Year 
Group 5 
Prop. SEN Pupils in Year Group 6 
 
  First Stage  Reduced Form  IV 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Prop. August 










-  - 
             
Prop. SEN 
Pupils  in  Year 
Group 5 





             
School-level 
controls 
  Y    Y    Y 
F test  -  -  -  -  16.4  18.2 
Obs.  81,208  81,208  81,208  81,208  81,208  81,208 
 
Note : set of all primary schools in England, excluding independent and special  schools, observed every year 
from  2002  to  2008.  All  regressions  include  control  dummies  for  school  type  (i.e.,  dummies  indicating  the  
quintile in the distribution across schools of mean KS1 over the period of observation) and cohort dummies. 
School-level controls are the following: proportion eligible to receive free school meals, proportion of boys, 
proportion  of  pupils  born  in  August    in    year  group  6,  size  of  year  group  6  and  year  group  6  KS1  past 
achievement at age 7. The F test on the last set of regressions stands for the Cragg Donald statistic of the 
excluded instrument. 36 
 
Table 5: The Effect of the Proportion of SEN Pupils on the Year Group 6 Performance at the 
End of Primary School 
 
  Dependant variables: 
 
  Proportion SEN Pupils in 
Year Group 6 
Year group 6 performance (KS2) 
 
  First Stage  Reduced Form  IV 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Prop. August 










-  - 
             
Prop. SEN 
Pupils  in  Year 
Group 6 





             
School-level 
controls 
  Y    Y    Y 
F test  -  -  -  -  5.88  6.21 
Obs.  81,208  81,208  81,208  81,208  81,208  81,208 
 
Note : set of all primary schools in England, excluding independent and special  schools, observed every year 
from 2002 to 2008. All regressions include control dummies for school type (i.e., dummies indicating the  
quintile in the distribution across schools of mean KS1 over the period of observation) and cohort dummies. 
School-level controls are the following: proportion eligible to receive free school meals, proportion of boys, 
proportion of pupils born in August  in  year group 6, size of year group 6 and year group 6 KS1 past 
achievement at age 7. The F test on the last set of regressions stands for the Cragg Donald statistic of the 
excluded instrument. 37 
 
Table 6: The Effect of the Proportion of SEN Pupils on the Year Group 6 Performance of Top 
Achievers at the End of Primary School. 
 
  Dependant variables: 
 
  Proportion of SEN Pupils 
among top achievers in 
Year Group 6 
Year group 6 performance (KS2) 
 
    Reduced Form  IV 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Prop. August 
born Year  
Group 5 








-  - 
             
Prop. SEN 
Pupils  in  Year 
Group 6 









             
School-level 
controls 
  Y    Y    Y 
F test  -  -      3.16  3.41 
Obs.  79,938  79,938  79,938  79,938  79,938  79,938 
 
Note : set of all primary schools in England, excluding independent and special  schools, observed every year 
from  2002  to  2008.  All  regressions  include  control  dummies  for  school  type  (i.e.,  dummies  indicating  the  
quintile in the distribution across schools of mean KS1 over the period of observation) and cohort dummies. 
School-level controls are the following, computed for the subsample of top achievers in the school: proportion of 
pupils eligible to receive free school meals, proportion of boys, proportion of pupils born in August  in  year 
group 6, size of year group 6 and year group 6 KS1 past achievement at age 7. The F test on the last set of 
regressions  stands  for  the  Cragg  Donald  statistic  of  the  excluded  instrument.  KS2  is  standardized  at  the 
individual level with mean 50 and standard deviation 10. An IV estimate of -10 would mean that a 10 percentage 
points increase in the SEN proportion in YG6 will decrease KS2 mean achievement by 1 tenth of an individual 
standard deviation. KS1 top achievers are pupils with KS1 strictly greater than 11. 
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 Appendix A: Robustness tests for the individual level regressions 
  
 
Figure A1: Variation in Performance at Age 11 (KS2) and probability of SEN Assignment 
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KS2-lowest KS2-highest SEN-lowest SEN-highest
 
For each KS1 score, the ‘KS2-lowest’ (resp. ‘KS2-highest’) line shows the average performance at age 11 of 
pupils attending schools in the worse (best) decile  of the distribution of average KS1. Symmetrically, the ‘SEN-
lowest’ (resp. ‘SEN-highest’) line shows the probability of SEN assignment at age 11 of pupils attending schools 


















Figure A2: Test Score at Age 7 and the Difference across Worst and Best Deciles of School 
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For each KS1 score, the full bold line shows the difference in the probability of SEN assignment between pupils 
attending schools in the best decile of average KS1 and pupils attending schools in the worst one. The dotted 
bold line shows the difference in the performance at age 11 between pupils attending schools in the best decile of 
average KS1 and pupils attending schools in the worst one. For each each bold line, the two thin dotted lines 
show confidence intervals. 40 
 
Figure A3: Variation in the Effect of School Context on Probability of SEN Assignment  at 
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Note: For each KS1 score, the full bold line shows the difference in the probability of SEN assignment at age 10 
between pupils attending schools above the median of the distribution of average KS1 and pupils attending 
schools below the median. The dotted bold line shows the difference in the performance at age 11 between 
pupils attending schools above the median of the distribution of average KS1 and pupils attending schools below 
the median. For each bold line, the two thin dotted lines show confidence intervals. 
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Appendix B: Robustness test for the school level regressions 
 
 
Table B1: Relationships between The Proportion of August born Pupils in Year Group 5 and 
The Demographic Characteristics of Year Group 6. 
 
  Dependant Variables: 








  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Proportion August 









Observations  81,208  81,208  81,208  81,208 
 
Note: All regressions in a set of dummies controlling for school type (i.e., dummies indicating the quintile in the 
distribution across schools of mean KS1 over the period of observation) and   additional control dummies: 
proportion of pupils eligible to receive free school meals,  proportion of boys, proportion of pupils born in 
August  in  year group 6, size of year group 6 and year group 6 KS1 past achievement at age 7 (excluding the 
dependant variable) 
 
 
  
 